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''Spinoza: Practical Philosophy'' ((フランス語:Spinoza: Philosophie pratique)) is a 1970 book by philosopher Gilles Deleuze, his last work published before his collaboration with psychoanalyst Félix Guattari on ''Anti-Oedipus'' (1972); a revised and expanded edition was published in 1981 by Les Editions du Minuit. In the book, Deleuze examines Baruch Spinoza's philosophy, discussing ''Ethics'' (1677) and other works such as the ''Tractatus Theologico-Politicus'' (1670), providing a lengthy chapter defining Spinoza's main concepts in dictionary form. Deleuze relates Spinoza's ethical philosophy to the writings of Friedrich Nietzsche and Willem van Blijenbergh, a grain broker who corresponded with Spinoza in the first half of 1665 and questioned the ethics of his concept of evil. ==Summary== Deleuze's discusses Spinoza's philosophy, providing a chapter defining Spinoza's main concepts in dictionary form.〔Deleuze 1988. pp. 44-109.〕 He relates Spinoza's ethical philosophy to the writings of Nietzsche, citing ''On the Genealogy of Morals'' (1887) and an 1881 letter to the theologian Franz Overbeck,〔Deleuze 1988. p. 3, 129.〕 and Blijenbergh, a grain broker who corresponded with Spinoza in the first half of 1665 and questioned the ethics of his concept of evil. Deleuze observes that Spinoza's letters to Blijenbergh are the only place in his work where he "considers the problem of evil per se", making them of unique importance, and records Spinoza's developing frustration with Blijenbergh.〔Deleuze 1988. p. 30 〕 Explaining Spinoza's use of the body as a model for philosophers, Deleuze writes that, "When a body 'encounters' another body, or an idea another idea, it happens that the two relations sometimes combine to form a more powerful whole, and sometimes one decomposes the other, destroying the cohesion of its parts...we experience ''joy'' when a body encounters ours and enters into composition with it, and ''sadness'' when, on the contrary, a body or an idea threatens our own coherence."〔Deleuze 1988. p. 19 〕 According to Deleuze, Spinoza sees consciousness as "transitive": "Consciousness is the passage, or rather the awareness of the passage from these less potent totalities to the more potent ones, and vice versa." Consciousness "is not a property of the Whole...it has only an informational value, and what is more, the information is necessarily confused and distorted."〔Deleuze 1988. p. 21 〕 To show how decomposition works, Deleuze uses Spinoza's example from the Hebrew Bible: the apple that Adam eats in the Garden of Eden.〔Deleuze 1988. p. 22 〕 When Adam hears God's command not to eat the forbidden fruit, he understands it as a prohibition. Deleuze notes that God's command refers to a fruit that will poison Adam if he eats it, which he describes as "an instance of an encounter between two bodies whose characteristic relations are not compatible...the fruit will determine the parts of Adam's body to enter into new relations that no longer accord with his own essence." Deleuze writes that, "...because Adam is ignorant of causes, he thinks that God morally forbids him something, whereas God only reveals the natural consequence of ingesting the fruit." He explains that Spinoza believes that everything defined as "evil" is of this type: "bad encounters, poisoning, intoxication, relational decomposition."〔 Spinoza thus replaces morality, which in Deleuze's words "always refers existence to transcendent values" and which represents God's judgment, with ethics, "a typology of immanent modes of existence". The opposition between good and evil is replaced by "the qualitative differences of modes of existence", an opposition between what is good and what is simply bad. In Spinoza's account, as described by Deleuze, "consciousness misapprehends all of Nature", and "...all one needs in order to moralize is to fail to understand." Misunderstanding a law makes it appear in the form of a moral 'You must.'"〔Deleuze 1988. p. 23 〕 The domain of the eternal truths of nature and that of the moral laws of institutions can be separated through considering their effects. Deleuze writes that, "Law, whether moral or ethical, does not provide us with any knowledge; it makes nothing known. At worst it prevents the formation of knowledge (''the law of the tyrant''). At best, it prepares for knowledge and makes it possible (''the law of Abraham or of Christ'')." He believes that ontology has historically been compromised by an error "whereby the command is mistaken for something to be understood, obedience for knowledge itself, and Being for ''Fiat''."〔Deleuze 1988. p. 24 〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Spinoza: Practical Philosophy」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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